The International Criminal Court and conflict transformation in Uganda: Views from the field by Malu, Linus Nnabuike
81
The International Criminal Court and 
conflict transformation in Uganda: 
Views from the field 
Abstract
The International Criminal Court (ICC) commenced investigation of the 
armed conf lict in Uganda in 2004. In 2005 it issued arrest warrants for 
five leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). This article examines 
how the court’s involvement in the situation has impacted on conf lict 
transformation in Uganda after ten years of judicial work. It also addresses 
the problem of assessing the impact of law on conf lict through the use 
of an analytical framework that is based on four variables: deterrence, 
victims’ rights, reconciliation, and accountability to the law. Relying on 
this framework, and on a report of a field research project in Uganda, 
it argues that the ICC’s intervention has had multiple impacts on the 
situation in Uganda, and that despite some arguments to the contrary, the 
ICC does promote conf lict transformation through deterrence, promotion 
of accountability to the law and promotion of victims’ rights.
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The struggle to promote accountability at national levels by the 
international community through international justice mechanisms has 
a fairly long and tortuous history, stretching back to 1919 after the First 
World War (Schabas 2012:6) and taking root in 1945 during the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials. There is also a domestic dimension to the evolution of 
international accountability which, Sikkink (2012:250) argues, comes from 
the diffusion of accountability practices from country to country, within 
regions, from region to region and finally f lowing into the international 
system of accountability.  As a result of these developments and the focus 
of the international community on human security, a new normative order 
seems to be emerging. This order emphasises the protection of people from 
abuse during conf lict and in peacetime, and accountability for abuses 
(Teitel 2011:10). These developments are concerned with protecting 
humanity both in human rights and criminal law contexts from abusive 
conduct on the part of states, officials, and criminal groups. Scholars 
such as Sikkink (2011:227) and Akhavan (2001:2) argue that prosecution 
in transitional societies could lead to improvements in human rights 
protection. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if the surge in accountability has 
indeed stirred more respect for the rule of law, or prevented conf licts. 
It is also debatable whether accountability has inspired peace (Drumbl 
2007:10). Since the end of the Second World War, for instance, armed 
conf lict continues to confront the world in different regions. The end of 
the Cold War gave rise to hopes of a new peace based on universal law 
and a new political order. But these hopes were dashed as conf lict arose 
in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and in different parts of Africa, 
coupled with the astounding rise in terrorism and religious fanaticism 
(Teitel 2011:10). The international community responded through direct 
interventions in several of these conf licts and through the deployment of 
international justice mechanisms in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Lebanon, East Timor and Cambodia, and finally, through the 
establishment of the ICC. The hope was that reliance on law and adherence 
to laws prohibiting aggression and other crimes could ultimately promote 
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peace and reduce conf licts (Schabas 2001:616). The ICC, an entirely new 
mechanism for conf lict transformation, represents the new order which 
embodies the progress of the international community in combating 
impunity. This new order frowns upon amnesty and requires that the terms 
of any peace agreement to be in accord with international law as enshrined 
in the Rome Statute.
To illustrate the above, this article examines the conf lict in northern 
Uganda between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the LRA, the peace 
efforts made at managing it, and the intervention of the ICC in the conf lict. 
The focus of the article is on the impact of the ICC’s intervention on conf lict 
transformation in northern Uganda. The central issue examined is whether 
the ICC is facilitating conf lict transformation or stalling/complicating it, 
or having little or no impact on it. The article explores these issues from 
the perspectives of relevant literature on international justice and conf lict 
transformation, and also from the findings of field research conducted 
in Uganda in 2013. Concerning the conf lict transformation in Uganda, 
this article relies on an analytical framework that integrates findings 
according to four variables: deterrence, promotion of victims’ rights, 
promotion of reconciliation, and promotion of accountability to the law. 
Once identified, many scholars use these terms to discuss and make sense of 
the impact that international justice has had on conf lict and post-conf lict 
situations (Akhavan 2001:1; Nouwen 2012:186). The article will examine 
this question in terms of how the ICC promotes accountability to the law, 
how it promotes victims’ redress, how it contributes to deterrence, and how 
it supports reconciliation processes. 
Darehshori and Evenson (2010:22) state that the ICC intervention in 
post-conf lict situations supports conf lict transformation. They argue 
that the existence of arrest warrants for leaders suspected of international 
crimes does not necessarily undermine the peace process. Also, Nouwen 
(2012:186) submits that the ICC, by operationalising international law 
and by deterring crimes is inevitably contributing to peace building in 
Africa. Lanz (2007:27) also opines that the peace and justice controversy in 
northern Uganda should be understood as a manifestation of the tensions 
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between different actors with different agendas and priorities, and that 
the ICC despite its limitations, promotes the peace process in Uganda. 
This article looks beyond the immediate issues of how to end the conf lict 
in northern Uganda, and how to build peace after the conf lict. It also 
focuses on the long term strategies of transforming conf lict in northern 
Uganda. It examines whether the ICC intervention contributes to conf lict 
transformation by providing long-term strategies for addressing some of 
the root causes of the violent conf lict, such as massive violations of human 
rights and systemic impunity embedded in the legal system of Uganda. 
The article therefore argues that the ICC will be contributing positively 
to conf lict transformation in Uganda if it promotes reconciliation, 
accountability to the law, rights of victims of atrocities, and deters future 
atrocities or gross human rights violations. It argues that the degree of 
impact will depend on the nature, degree and scope of impact on all or 
some of the variables.
2. Methodology
A qualitative methodology was used for the research. Data for the research 
was collated from in-depth interviews, and from answers to questionnaires 
which were administered to respondents in Uganda. The researcher visited 
Uganda from 10 November 2013 to 3 December 2013 and interviewed 
some of the respondents. Also, from January, 2014 to February 2015, the 
researcher administered questionnaires to respondents in Uganda. A total 
of twenty persons were given in-depth interview, while two questionnaires 
were administered to two respondents. The respondents were lawyers, staff 
of some NGOs who work on transitional justice, one law teacher, human 
rights activists, researchers, one government official, one religious leader, 
youth leaders and other experts involved with international justice and 
conf lict transformation in Uganda. Data for this study was mainly drawn 
from interviews, although most case studies involve the use of multiple 
methodologies. Such methodologies were not used because of the financial 
limitation on this study. Also, the results of the study were not compared 
with results from other sources. Still, the in-depth interviews used have 
been a rich source of qualitative research data. 
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3. Synopsis of the conflict in Northern Uganda
The conf lict in northern Uganda erupted after the National Resistance 
Army/Movement (NRA/M) took over the government of Uganda in 
January 1986 (Human Rights Watch 2005:8), and the subsequent NRA/M’s 
attacks on Acholis occurred after the regime change (Otunnu 2002:11; 
Royo 2008:6). Economic and political divisions and disparities between 
the north and south, partly created by the colonial government and 
exacerbated by the post-independence governments, are frequently cited 
as some of the main causes of the conf lict (Happold 2007:4; Mallinder 
2009:6; Royo 2008:6).
After the overthrow of General Tito Lutwa Okello in January 1986 by the 
NRA/M, embattled government soldiers from the deposed regime f led to 
the north, and to neighbouring countries (Royo 2008:8). In subsequent 
months, these soldiers who were mainly from northern Uganda, re-grouped 
under different armed organisations (the most significant among them 
was the Uganda People Democratic Army [UPDA]) to fight the NRA 
and to protect the interests of the north (Human Rights Watch 2005:8). 
The crisis in the north also led to the emergence of political and military 
leaders who claimed to be spirit mediums.1 One such leader was Alice 
Auma Lakwena, who established the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and led 
armed campaigns against the NRA (Mallinder 2009:7). These northern 
resistance groups soon disappeared: the HSM was crushed at Jinja as its 
soldiers marched toward Kampala in late 1986, while the UPDA signed a 
peace agreement in 1988 with the GoU (O’Kadameri 2002:35). The demise 
of the two groups created a vacuum which was filled by the former members 
of these groups, who later formed two other new groups: The Lord’s Army 
(Also called Holy Spirit Movement II), led by Alice Aluma Lakwena’s 
father, Savarino Lukoya, and the LRA, led by Joseph Kony (O’Kadameri 
2002:34). The Lord’s Army quickly disintegrated because the leader could 
not provide the charisma reminiscent of the Alice Lakwena era. The LRA 
led by charismatic Joseph Kony combined spiritual elements and military 
powers to become the de facto resistance movement.
1 Spirit mediums were people in northern Uganda who claimed they were possessed by 
certain spirits, and thus were purportedly directed by the spirits.
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The LRA enjoyed the support of the Sudanese government, but this stopped 
after the signing of the Nairobi Peace Agreement in 20052 (Human Rights 
Watch 2005:9). Between 1989 and 1991 the group killed hundreds of people, 
abducted thousands from  villages in northern Uganda, and also tortured 
and mutilated civilians by cutting off their hands, ears or lips (Nyeko and 
Okello 2002:18; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Uganda 
Human Rights Commission 2011:xiii). Over 66  000 persons were said to 
have been abducted in Acholi land between 1998 and 2005, with 20% of 
male abductees and 5% of female abductees believed to have been killed 
(UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Uganda Human Rights 
Commission 2011:xiii).
In 2002, the Ugandan Army (also called the Uganda Peoples Defence 
Forces [UPDF]), with the Sudanese government’s consent launched 
‘Operation Iron Fist I’, and in 2004 ‘Operation Iron Fist II’ against the 
LRA inside Sudan. In response, the LRA f led to northern Uganda where 
it expanded its operations to areas previously untouched by the war, such 
as Lira and Teso sub-regions in eastern Uganda, and territories in the DRC 
(Lanz 2007:6). The LRA also began larger scale abductions, killings, looting, 
and general attacks on civilians, thus causing an upsurge in the number of 
people leaving their homes and exacerbating the humanitarian situation. 
The government responded by ordering people in abandoned villages to 
move to government camps. According to a Human Rights Watch account 
(2005:10), there were more than 500 000 internally displaced persons in 
early 2002. By late 2002, as a result of LRA’s return to northern Uganda, 
and under the UPDF order, the number increased to about 800 000. 
The LRA has since 2005 been driven out of northern Uganda. Its operations 
have also decreased and are now limited to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Central African Republic.
2 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by the Government of Sudan and 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement to end the Second Sudanese civil war, and to 
develop a timetable for the independence of Southern Sudan.
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4. The International Criminal Court’s intervention in 
the conflict.
Uganda signed the Rome Statute in 1998 and later ratified it in June 
2002. The conf lict in northern Uganda was subsequently referred to the 
ICC in December 2003, by the GoU. In July 2004, the chief prosecutor 
decided that there was a reasonable basis to open an investigation into the 
‘situation concerning northern Uganda’. The chief prosecutor later filed an 
application for warrants of arrest for five leaders of the LRA. No member 
of the UPDF was indicted because, according to the chief prosecutor, the 
crimes committed by the LRA were of higher gravity than those allegedly 
committed by the Ugandan Army (Lanz 2007:7). In July 2005, Pre-Trial 
Chamber 11 of the ICC granted the chief prosecutor’s application, and issued 
warrants of arrest for five LRA leaders, namely: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, 
Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, and Dominic Ongwen. The warrants of 
arrest were unsealed in October 2005. The cases against Raska Lukwiya 
and Okot Odhiambo were terminated after their deaths were confirmed. 
In 2014 Dominic Ongwen surrendered, and is currently in the custody of 
the ICC, charged with three counts of crimes against humanity and four 
counts of war crimes. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti are still at large. 
The intervention of the ICC in Uganda was received with mixed 
reaction (Tenove 2013:3). While the intervention was welcomed by most 
international human rights and justice non-governmental organisations 
(Allen 2006:96), it received a hostile reception from many local groups in 
the north, such as Acholi leaders, local non-governmental organisations, the 
Amnesty Commission of Uganda, and religious groups under the auspices 
of Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiatives (ARLPI).  The main concerns 
about the ICC intervention were that: the timing of the arrest warrant was 
ill-conceived; the chief prosecutor did not make public the results of his 
investigations into the crimes committed by the UPDF (Human Rights 
Watch 2012:5); the court was biased (Mallinder 2009:39), and the ICC will 
exacerbate the conf lict or complicate the peace process.
88
Linus Nnabuike Malu
Another concern about the ICC in Uganda is that it sidelines traditional 
mechanisms for conflict resolution and reconciliation, thereby allegedly 
complicating the peace process. The ICC is perceived as an inappropriate 
imposition that dispenses a foreign concept of justice, without the capacity 
to heal psychological wounds, establish individual responsibility, and 
reconcile parties to the conflicts. The proposition for the use of traditional 
transitional justice mechanisms for the conflict came from various groups, 
including human rights activists, peace activists, aid workers, religious 
groups, traditional leaders, and representatives of the LRA. The GoU 
is also in support. Though it referred the situation to the ICC in 2003, in 
2007 – following the peace talks in Juba – it also signed an agreement on 
accountability and reconciliation with the LRA. This proposed among other 
things, that local measures drawn from the customs of the Acholis and their 
neighbours should be recognised and incorporated into Ugandan law.3 
5. The Amnesty Programme in Uganda
The current amnesty was introduced to Uganda in January 2000 as part of the 
government’s efforts to implement its policy of reconciliation and establish 
peace and security in the country. The programme was introduced after 
years of violent conf lict and disastrous attempts by the government to end 
these conf licts through the use of force (Hovil and Lomo 2005:3). Thus, the 
Amnesty Act was enacted in 2000 to provide amnesty to Ugandans involved 
in armed conf licts in various parts of the country. The central objective is 
to entice people to abandon insurgency without fear of prosecution, with 
the aim of ending the conf licts in various parts of Uganda (International 
Centre for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Centre, University of 
California 2005:46). Since the enactment of the Act, over 26 000 persons 
have benefited from the Amnesty Programme (Interview with an Officer 
of the Amnesty Commission of Uganda, 21 November 2013). But only 5 000 
have been resettled (Daily Monitor Newspaper, 16 May 2013). Out of this 
number, only 55% were from the LRA (Mallinder 2009:31).
3 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation signed between the GoU and the LRA 
during the JPT. See Beyond Juba: Building consensus on sustainable peace in Uganda 2015.
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The Amnesty programme introduced by the 2000 Act is popular as there 
seems to be wide-spread support for it as one of the mechanisms of conf lict 
transformation in northern Uganda (Hovil and Lomo 2005:31; International 
Centre for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Centre, University of 
California  2005:47). Research conducted by Refugee Law Project (2005:2) 
shows that ’despite a number of challenges in its implementation, the 
Amnesty Law is perceived as a vital tool for conf lict resolution, and for 
long-term reconciliation and peace within the specific context in which it is 
operating’. The programme has also been praised for its ability to promote 
the peace process, and encourage combatants to surrender. According to a 
respondent, the programme is ’one path towards peace because if the rebels 
all come out, including their commanders then peace can also prevail, and 
then justice can follow/come later’ (Interview with a member of the Acholi 
Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives, 14 January 2015). The programme 
is nonetheless criticised for its inability to impact significantly4 on LRA 
members (Mallinder 2009:31). Most of the respondents interviewed during 
this study in Uganda5 state that amnesty is important for the resolution 
of the conf lict in the north because the majority of the people who 
participated in war were former abductees who deserve amnesty (Interview 
with a Law Lecturer in Uganda, 14 November 2013), and because amnesty 
will assist in settling the conf licts since it facilitates reconciliation and 
resettlement (Interview with a Legal Practitioner in Uganda, 27 November 
2013). Other respondents argue that the amnesty programme supports 
the peace process by enabling people to abandon the rebellion and return 
to their homes (Interview with a Youth leader from northern Uganda, 
30 November 2013), and that African culture and processes of peace support 
amnesty, forgiveness, reconciliation, and performance of rituals to cleanse 
the society (Interview with a Lecturer in peace and conf lict resolution in 
Uganda, 15 November 2013). Another view is that in addressing conf lict 
transformation all mechanisms, including amnesty should be explored 
4 Mallinder (2009:1) states that only 55% of those that benefited from the programme are 
LRA members.
5 Interviews were conducted in Uganda between 11 November 2013 and 2 December 2013. 
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(Interview with a female NGO Executive in Uganda, 20 November 2013). 
However, several respondents objected to the granting of amnesty to senior 
members of the LRA who committed grave international crimes. 
They argue that such persons should be punished.6 The views of respondents 
in support of the Amnesty programme are captured by one interviewee, 
who stated: 
Amnesty helped the peace process in Uganda. First, in the amnesty 
programme, there is a perspective for peace and reconciliation, because 
of the nature of the conflict, since we were dealing with our children, 
amnesty was important. Second, there is no contradiction in the 
ICC interventions and the amnesty programme of the government 
(Interview with a Lecturer in Uganda, 14 November 2013).
The amnesty programme in Uganda, despite its procedural, legal, financial 
and implementation challenges is good for conf lict transformation since 
it has facilitated the return of over 26 000 persons, some of them from the 
LRA. The ICC’s involvement does not stop the rank-and-file LRA fighters 
from taking advantage of the amnesty programme, but, as alleged by the 
LRA leaders during the Juba Peace Talks, the ICC may be blocking the 
leaders of the LRA from taking advantage of the amnesty programme, and 
to that extent may be complicating the peaceful resolution of the conf lict.
6. The Juba Peace Talks
One of the main initiatives to end the conf lict in northern Uganda was 
the Juba Peace Talks (JPT) held in Juba, South Sudan, between the GoU 
and the LRA from July 2006 to April 2008. The JPT was mediated by the 
then South Sudan Vice-President, Riek Machar (Wijeyaratne 2008:4). 
The negotiation produced six main documents or agreements signed by the 
GoU and the LRA.  The Final Peace Agreement (FPA) signing ceremony was 
arranged for April 2008 in Ri-Kwangba, but Kony failed to arrive for the 
ceremony. The failure of the LRA to sign the FPA was a big disappointment 
to many (Wijeyaratne 2008:5). However, some of the agreements are 
6 The majority of those interviewed in Uganda in November 2013 and December 2013 
shares this view.
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already being implemented by the GoU.  For instance, the establishment 
of the International Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda in 
2008 is as a result of the agreement on accountability and reconciliation. 
The JPT is also credited for promoting the peace process, improving 
security in northern Uganda and embedding international accountability 
standards into the negotiation agenda (International Crisis Group 2007:8). 
The ICC has been criticised for obstructing the Peace Talks by refusing to 
withdraw the arrest warrants for five LRA leaders and for being directly 
responsible for the refusal of the LRA to sign the FPA as Kony was said 
to fear being apprehended and taken to the Hague (Nouwen 2012:186; 
Tenove 2013:3). But the ICC was credited for propelling the Peace Talks 
as the threat of international prosecution helped to bring the LRA to the 
negotiation table. It was also credited with making accountability one of 
the core issues during the negotiation (International Crisis Group 2007:12). 
Thus, the ICC impacted both positively and negatively on the peace process, 
and also on conf lict transformation in Uganda in similar ways. 
The preponderance of opinion from respondents is that the intervention 
of the ICC propelled the peace process by inf luencing the LRA to join the 
JPT. This view was canvassed by some of the respondents who opine that 
it is doubtful if the LRA would have joined the JPT if the ICC had not 
indicted its leaders. They argue that the LRA leadership calculated that 
they could neutralise the ICC intervention and the arrest warrants by 
seeking peace. One  such respondent is a Legal Practitioner in Uganda who 
argued that ‘the ICC was a driver to the Juba Peace Talks and promoted the 
peace process in Uganda positively by indicting leaders of the LRA, which 
forced them to negotiate for peace’ (Interview with a Legal Practitioner in 
Uganda, 27 November 2013). The Director and the Project Coordinator of 
a peace and conf lict organisation who were interviewed together in Uganda 
said as much when they stated that ‘the ICC was one of the key factors 
that inf luenced the LRA to the negotiating table, and the Juba Peace Talks 
were very useful as they led to discussions about the Ugandan conf lict, 
and eventually to the withdrawal of the LRA from Northern Uganda’ 
(Interview with a Director and the Project Coordinator of a Peace NGO 
in Uganda, 21 November 2013). However, there is a minority view that 
92
Linus Nnabuike Malu
the ICC intervention stalled the JPT and frustrated the peace process. 
One youth leader submitted that, ‘the ICC has negatively impacted on the 
peace process in Uganda. It was clear the ICC disrupted the Juba peace 
deal, because Kony was about to sign the peace agreement, but refused 
because of the intervention of the ICC’ (Interview with a youth leader and 
also the project coordinator of a NGO in Uganda, 25 November 2013).
7. Furthering national efforts to promote accountability 
to the Law in Uganda
The intention of the ICC to establish accountability at national levels is 
clearly stated in the preamble to the Rome Statute where it is declared that 
‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must 
be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation’.7 Accountability to the law suffered during the 
years of conf lict in Uganda. In the north, where the LRA held sway, there 
was almost a total collapse of justice administration institutions. In the 
south, the rule of law also suffered as neither the LRA nor government 
forces that committed grave human rights abuses against civilians during 
the years of conf lict in the north were prosecuted (Human Rights Watch 
2012:10).  Since the end of the conf lict in the north, the GoU has made both 
restoration of the rule of law and accountability to the law cardinal points 
of its administration. The GoU embarked on the process of re-opening 
administration of justice institutions in the north, building new courts, 
establishing the International War Crimes Division of the High Court 
of Uganda (Tadeo 2012:1), and publishing a comprehensive transitional 
justice policy. 
This section examines how the ICC intervention impacts on accountability 
to the law in Uganda by arguing that: (a) the ICC inf luenced the enactment 
of accountability-promoting laws, to the extent that, some legislation 
promoting accountability to the law were enacted/amended after the 
ICC became engaged, and (b) the ICC inf luenced the establishment of 
7 Paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the Rome Statute (States Parties to the Rome Statute 1998).
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administration of justice promoting institutions, to the extent that some 
justice administration institutions were established/reformed after the ICC 
intervened. There are some connections between the involvement of the ICC 
in Uganda and/or the creation of more justice administration institutions, 
or the introduction of reforms in some existing justice administration 
institutions. It is not clear whether the ICC inf luenced the establishment of 
these institutions or the introduction of these reforms. However, it is clear 
that these developments took place after the ICC intervened in Uganda, 
and secondly, that these reforms and institutions attempt to mirror 
international standards or models. The GoU established the International 
Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda in 2008 to try those who 
committed international and other crimes. The International Crimes 
Division is modelled after international tribunals, comprising a Bench of 
at least three Judges, a Registry, an Office of the Prosecutor, and that of the 
Defence Counsel.  Another important development is the establishment of 
the Justice, Law and Order Sector which works on justice reforms, law and 
order. These developments were linked to the interventions of the ICC in 
Uganda by several respondents in Uganda.  The point was clearly made by 
a respondent who opined that ‘the ICC has promoted the establishment 
of the International Crimes Court in Uganda and has entrenched the rule 
of law in the area of international crimes, because right now, we have a 
full court dealing with international crimes (Interview with a staff of an 
International organisation in Uganda, 25 November 2013).
A former head of the Ugandan Human Rights Commission also stated that:
The whole discussion of establishing the Uganda international crimes 
court was because of the ICC. The whole debate about establishing 
the transitional justice system in Uganda was because of the ICC 
intervention. Also, the intervention of the ICC has helped in promoting 
access to justice in Uganda, as there are now more mechanisms for 
promoting the rule of law and accessing the courts in Uganda (Interview 
with a former head of the Ugandan Human Rights Commission, in 
Uganda, 18 November 2013).
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The ICC inf luenced the enactment of accountability promoting laws, 
to the extent that some accountability to the law promotion laws were 
enacted/amended after the ICC got involved. Some of these laws mimic 
international laws while some introduced reforms. This article does not 
argue that the ICC directly facilitated the enactment of these laws and 
regulations, but affirms that since these laws and regulations came into 
place after the ICC involvement, and some of the provisions mirror their 
international counterparts, there is likelihood that the ICC involvement 
may have inf luenced the decisions to enact these laws and regulations. 
For instance, the GoU enacted the International Criminal Court Act, 
2010, signed the Accountability and Reconciliation Agreement with 
the LRA, and published a comprehensive Transitional Justice Policy. 
Also, The Prevention of Genocide Bill, 2015 is currently before the 
Ugandan Parliament. The bill seeks to, among other things, establish an 
Independent National Committee to spearhead the fight against genocide. 
Many respondents in Uganda argue that the involvement of the ICC in 
Uganda may have inf luenced the decision of the GoU to take these steps. 
One such respondent is a legal practitioner in Uganda who argued that there 
are many positive contributions of the ICC to the rule of law. ‘Some are: 
it lead to the enactment of the Ugandan ICC Act, it lead to the establishment 
of the War Crimes Court, within the High Court, and last government now 
has embark in the development of a transitional justice policy’ (Interview 
with a Legal Practitioner in Uganda, 27 November 2013).
However, the enactment of these laws and the establishment of justice 
administration institutions have not led to the prosecution of more people 
for crimes committed during the armed conf lict in northern Uganda. 
Presently, only Thomas Kwoyelo is being prosecuted in the International 
War Crime Division of the High Court of Uganda. The case is still pending 
because the Supreme Court of Uganda has only recently ruled that Thomas 
Kwoyelo’s trial before the International Crimes Division of the High Court 
of Uganda must resume (Uganda v Thomas Kwoyelo, Constitutional 
Appeal N0.01 of 2012). This is an appeal by GoU against the decision of 
the Constitution Court of Uganda which directed the International Crimes 
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Division of the High Court to end the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo (International 
Centre for Transitional Justice 2015:4). Thus, the establishment of rule 
of law promotion institutions and the enactment of laws and regulations 
that mirror international standards does not automatically lead to the 
promotion of accountability to the law at national level. However, the 
incorporation of these international crimes into domestic laws could lead 
to greater pressure for judicial accountability for perpetrators of gross 
violations of human rights (Freeland 2010:7).
8. Promoting victims’ rights
The Rome Statute makes several references to the roles and interests of 
victims, including the right of victims to intervene in proceedings, the 
establishment of a Victims and Witnesses Unit within the Registry, the 
recognition of entitlement of victims to reparations (Schabas 2007:323), 
and the establishment of the Trust Funds for Victims (TFV). The Rules of 
Procedure of the ICC also provide that a Chamber in making any direction 
or order, and other organs of the court in performing their functions under 
the Statute or the Rules, shall take into account the needs of all victims 
and witnesses.8
In Uganda, the ICC has not approved reparations for victims of the armed 
conf lict, since the court is just about to commence the trial of Dominic 
Ongwen, the first case from that country. However, the TFV has been 
active in northern Uganda and has established about eighteen projects, 
designed to assist victims of the conf lict in northern Uganda. Presently, 
the TFV-funded partners in northern Uganda have provided services to 
an estimated 39 750 victims of crimes against humanity and war crimes 
(McCleary-Sills and Mukasa 2013:10). The ICC’s victims’ redress mandate 
provides exceptional opportunities for the ICC to contribute to peace 
(Nester 2006:9). Also, the TFV considers its assistance to victims a key 
step towards establishing durable peace and reconciliation in conf lict 
settings, such as northern Uganda. Most of the respondents argue that the 
8 Rules of Procedures and Evidence Document ICC-ASP/1/3, pp10–107, Rule 86.
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TFV’s projects will have long lasting impact on victims and on conf lict 
transformation, as it promotes reconciliation and rehabilitation, and 
assists such victims in rebuilding their lives and their communities. 
The TFV projects were also described as capable of promoting sustainable 
peace in these communities, because they will assist victims to return to a 
dignified and community life. They agreed that the TFV projects are very 
useful to individuals and communities that suffered from the brutality of 
the LRA and government forces, during the armed conf lict in the north. 
For instance, the project coordinator of an NGO that works on victims 
rehabilitation stated that victims’ protection projects will assist people to 
resettle, and will promote peace and conf lict transformation (Interview 
with the Project Coordinator of an NGO that works on victims’ redress 
in Uganda, 23 November 2013). Also, the head of a human rights NGO 
argued that the TFV projects will promote peace and reconciliation, and 
support the resettlement programmes of the GoU (Interview with the head 
of a Human Rights NGO in Uganda, 26 November 2013). Relying on these 
comments and arguments, it is contended that these TFV projects will not 
negate conf lict transformation but will positively contribute to the peace 
process in Uganda.
9. Promoting reconciliation in Uganda.
Defining reconciliation is complex because of its varying contexts, diverse 
understandings, and because it means different things to different people 
(Tolbert 2013:2). In its broadest sense, reconciliation could mean the 
establishment of strong patterns of social trust and cooperation across 
ethnic lines in post-conf lict societies (Nalepa 2010:318). In Uganda, 
and in this article, reconciliation has been identified as the healing of 
wounds of conf lict, mistrust, prejudice and marginalisation (Civil Society 
Consultative Conference 2007:ii). Interventions by an international 
criminal justice system in a post-conf lict situation could facilitate the 
process of reconciliation (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002:598). The main 
argument of the proponents of the ICC is that the court creates conditions 
which are conducive for reconciliation, which is important for peacebuilding 
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(Fisher 2010: 424).  There is another view that there is insufficient evidence 
to conclude that international justice contributes to national reconciliation 
(Drumbl 2007:150; Tolbert 2013:4). 
The intervention of the ICC in Uganda is perceived by some respondents 
as contributing to reconciliation in the long-term in Uganda, by creating 
the necessary environment for reconciliation. In the words of Akhavan 
(1997:339), ‘the symbolic effects of prosecuting even a limited number of 
such leaders before an international jurisdiction would have considerable 
impact on national reconciliation as well as deterrence of such crimes in 
future’. Some respondents were of the opinion that the ICC, by tackling 
impunity and promoting accountability, is contributing to the process of 
establishing democratic principles, based on the rule of law, which could be 
useful in transforming some of their problems and facilitating reconciliation 
in the long term.  For instance, a youth leader in Uganda argued that ‘the 
ICC intervention has some impacts on reconciliation, since it has helped 
the society to stabilise and to promote the peace process’ (Interview with a 
Project Coordinator of an NGO in Uganda, 25 November 2013). Another 
respondent stated that ‘the interventions of the ICC made Ugandans start 
thinking about reconciliation’ (Interview with an international justice 
expert with Advocates Sans Frontiers in Uganda, 26 November 2013).
However, these views are contested by some who think that retributive 
justice in Uganda may not lead to reconciliation and that more emphasis 
should be placed on restorative justice mechanisms (Murithi and Ngari 
2010:7) such as the traditional justice mechanisms and the amnesty 
programme of the government. The ICC in Uganda is also seen to be 
engaged in selective prosecutions which have polarised the country further 
along the north-south divide (Interview with a Lecturer in Law in Uganda, 
14 November 2014). It is also blamed for contributing to prolonging the 
war as a result of the arrest warrants on leaders of the LRA. For example, 
Kony refused to sign the FPA unless the arrest warrants were withdrawn 
(Nouwen 2012:186).  In summary, this article argues, that, on the weight of 
evidence, the involvement of the ICC does not contribute to reconciliation 




10. Deterring atrocities in Uganda.
Advocates of international criminal justice insist that the involvement of 
international courts in conf lict and post-conf lict situations contributes 
to deterring future atrocities because individual accountability is an 
important part of a preventive strategy, necessary for sustainable peace 
building (Akhavan 2001:10). Deterrence consists of general deterrence 
which is designed to prevent crime in the general population, or to prevent 
others from committing similar crimes to the accused, and specific 
deterrence, which is designed to deter the specific offender from committing 
the same crime or other crimes in future (Akhavan 2001:12). The main 
principles of the deterrence theory are: severity, certainty, and swiftness 
(Wright 2010:2).
The main argument in support of the positive impact of the ICC on future 
gross human right abusers is that, because of the presence of the ICC and its 
permanent nature, the possibility of ICC intervention is one factor future 
human rights violators now take into consideration when making decisions. 
It may be argued that the ICC contributes to general deterrence in Uganda 
by threatening punishment, deterring crimes by increasing their costs. 
According to the cost-benefit argument of deterrence, the ICC increases 
the costs of committing crime by increasing the certainty and severity of 
prompt punishment (Akhavan 2001:1–9). Most respondents agree that the 
ICC has deterred military and political leaders from committing atrocities 
– since the ICC has the power to ‘touch the untouchables’ (Interview with 
the Director of a Youth Organisation in Uganda, 21 November 2013). 
A respondent argued that politicians and other top business leaders in 
Uganda are now afraid of the ICC, so they are likely to be more cautious 
about human right abuses (Interview with a former Head of the Ugandan 
Human Rights Commission, 21 November 2013). Another opinion is 
that the ICC has promoted respect for the law in Uganda, and people are 
conscious of the power of the ICC to prosecute (Interview with a Human 
Rights expert in Uganda, 29 November 2013).
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After viewing the totality of the actions of the ICC in Uganda, one 
international justice expert also opined that it does have the capability to 
deter, since it has the power to sanction (Interview with an international 
justice expert with Advocates Sans Frontiers in Uganda, 26 November 2013).
In Uganda, the ICC is contributing to conf lict prevention through 
deterrence without actually prosecuting most of the indicted leaders of the 
LRA. Its actions include, the Prosecution of Dominic Ongwen, the ICC’s 
numerous public comments on the situation in Uganda, its investigations 
in Uganda, and the issuing of arrest warrants for five leaders of the LRA. 
As a permanent international court, the ICC is also a constant reminder to 
all would-be violators of international norms in Uganda that their conduct 
can be punished.  These conclusions are in line with the main argument 
proffered by deterrence theorists that an increase in the likelihood of 
imposition of sanctions will lead to a decrease in violations. Before the 
intervention of the ICC, a system of impunity for political leaders was 
evident in the country’s justice system as those who committed atrocities 
during previous and past armed conf licts in Uganda were not prosecuted. 
Since the ICC’s intervention, prosecution of those who commit international 
crimes became more likely. The cost of committing international crimes 
increased, and the benefits have remained relatively constant.
11. Conclusion
The involvement of the ICC in Uganda brought international justice 
nearer to the country after many years of armed conf lict, atrocities and 
impunity. Ten years down the line, this article argues, the ICC is facilitating 
conf lict transformation, by promoting accountability to the law through 
enactment of laws that promote accountability. It has also encouraged 
the establishment of justice institutions. The ICC also promotes general 
deterrence by its investigation and prosecution, increasing the likelihood 
of sanctions. Also, it was argued that the ICC, through the TFV, has 
positively impacted on peace in some communities. On the other hand, the 
ICC in the short term does not seem to be contributing to reconciliation 
in Uganda, but may promote reconciliation in the long-run as the impact 
100
Linus Nnabuike Malu
of accountability becomes established. The ICC had positive and negative 
impacts on the JPT. The ICC is criticised for obstructing the Peace Talks 
and for being partly responsible for the refusal of the LRA leaders to sign 
the FPA. However, the ICC is also hailed for propelling the Talks, because 
the threat of international prosecution by the ICC contributed to bringing 
the LRA to the negotiation table, and for making accountability one of 
the core issues during the negotiation. Put together, and on balance, this 
article concludes that the ICC involvement in Uganda facilitates conf lict 
transformation. However, the ICC needs to work with the GoU to ensure 
that its involvement in Uganda does not block amnesty for the  low-level 
LRA soldiers who may still want to return home. It is also important to 
intensify efforts to ensure that all those indicted by the ICC in Uganda are 
brought before it.
Sources
Akhavan, Payam 1997. Justice and reconciliation in the great lakes region of Africa: 
The contribution of the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda. Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law, 7 (2), pp. 325–348.
Akhavan, Payam 2001. Beyond impunity: can international criminal justice prevent future 
atrocities? The American Journal of International Law, 95 (7), pp.7–31.
Allen, Tim 2006. Trial justice: The international criminal court and the lord’s resistance army. 
London, Zed Books.
Beyond Juba: Building consensus on sustainable peace in Uganda 2015. Agreement on 
Accountability and Reconciliation signed between the GoU and the LRA during the JPT. 
Available from: <http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreements.php> [Accessed 
4 September 2014].
Civil Society Consultative Conference 2007. Report of the civil society consultative 
conference on paving the way for a sustainable reconciliation process in Uganda. 
Available from: <http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/Conference_presentations/
Reconciliation_Conference_Report.pdf> [Accessed 20 September 2014].
Darehshori, Sara and Elizabeth Evenson 2010. Peace, justice, and the international criminal court. 
Oxford Transitional Justice Research, Research Article 1. Available from: <http://www.csls.
ox.ac.uk/documents/DarehshoriandEvenson2010.pdf> [Accessed 4 September 2014].
Drumbl, Mark 2007. Atrocity, punishment and international law. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press.
Fisher, Martina 2010. Transitional justice and reconciliation: Theory and practice. Available 
from: <www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/fisher_tj_and_rec_
handbook> [Accessed 16 April 2014].
101
The International Criminal Court and conflict transformation in Uganda
Fletcher, Laurel and Harvey Weinstein 2002. Violence and social repair: Rethinking the 
contributions of justice to reconciliation. Human Rights Quarterly, 24, pp. 573–639.
Freeland, Steven 2010. Effectiveness of international criminal justice. Available from: <http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ALRS/2008/16.html> [Accessed 20 September 2015].
Happold, Mathew 2007. The international criminal court and the lord’s resistance army. 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 8, pp.1–26.
Hovil, Lucy and  Zachary Lomo 2005. Whose justice? Perception of Uganda’s amnesty act 
2000: The potential for conflict resolution and long term reconciliation. Available from: 
<http://www.refugeelawproject.org.htm> [Accessed 8 September 2014].
Human Rights Watch 2005. Uprooted and forgotten: Impunity and human rights abuses 
in northern Uganda. Available from: <http://www.humanrightswatch.org.htm> 
[Accessed 16 October 2014].
Human Rights Watch 2012. Justice for serious crimes before national courts: Uganda’s 
international crimes division. Available from: <http://www.hrw.org.htm> [Accessed 
9 August 2014].
International Centre for Transitional Justice 2015. Pursuing accountability for serious crimes 
in Uganda’s courts. Available from: <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-
Uganda-Kwoyelo-2015> [Accessed 13 August 2015].
International Centre for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Centre, University of 
California, Berkeley 2005. Forgotten voices: A population-based survey on attitudes 
about peace and justice in northern Uganda. Available from: <www.ictj.org> [Accessed 
28 May 2014].
International Crisis Group 2007. Seizing the opportunity for peace. Africa Report No 124, 
26 April 2007. Available from: < http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-
africa/uganda/124-northern-uganda-seizing-the-opportunity-for-peace.aspx> [Accessed 
9 August 2014].
Lanz, David 2007. The ICC’s intervention in northern Uganda: Beyond the simplicity of 
peace vs. justice. Available from: <http://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/
resources/EC66215A0071F156C12573910051D06D-Full_Report.pdf.htm> [Accessed 
4 September 2014].
Mallinder, Louise 2009. Uganda at a crossroads: Narrowing the amnesty? Available from: 
<http://www.academia.edu/205946/Uganda_at_a_Crossroads_Narrowing_the_Amnesty.
htm> [Accessed 7 September 2014].
McCleary-Sills, Jennifer and Stella Mukasa 2013. External evaluation of the trust fund 
for victims’ programmes in northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Towards a perspective for upcoming interventions. Available from: <http://www.icrw.org.
htm> [Accessed 10 September 2014].
Murithi, Tim and Allan Ngari 2010. The ICC and community-level reconciliation: In-country 
perspectives regional consultation report. Available from: <www.ijr.org.za.htm> 
[Accessed  20 August 2014].
102
Linus Nnabuike Malu
Nalepa, Monika 2012. Reconciliation, refuge returns, and international criminal justice: 
The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: Williams, Melissa, and Rosemary Nagy eds. 
Transitional justice. New York, New York University Press.  
Nester, Adam 2006.Victim’s issues, multi-track diplomacy and the International Criminal 
Court. Available from: <http://www.http://imtd.imtdeast.org/papers/OP-17.pdf.htm> 
[Accessed 30 September 2014].
Nyeko, Balam and Lucima Okello 2002. Profile of the parties to the conflict. In: Okello 2002.
Nouwen, Sarah 2012. The International Criminal Court: A peace-builder in Africa? In: Devon, 
Curtis and Dzinesa Gwinyagi eds. Peace-building, power, and politics in Africa. Ohio, Ohio 
University Press. pp 171–192.
O’Kadameri, Billie 2002. LRA/government negotiations, 1993–94. In: Okello 2002.
Okello, Lucima ed. 2002. Protracted conflicts, elusive peace. Available from: <http://www.c-r.org.htm> 
[Accessed 12 July 2014].
Otunnu, Ogenga 2002. Causes and consequences of the war in Acholi land. In Okello 2002.
Refugee Law Project 2005. Update on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees in Uganda. March 
2005. Available from: <http://www.refugeelawproject.org/current-issues.htm> [Accessed 
30 September 2014].  
Royo, Josep Maria 2008. War and peace scenarios in northern Uganda. Quaderns de Construccio 
de Pau, 6. Available from: <http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/qcp/war_peace_uganda.pdf> 
[Accessed 20 June 2015].
Schabas, William 2001. International law responses to conflict. In: Croaker, C, F. Hampson and 
P. Aall eds. Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict. Washington 
D.C., United States Institute of Peace.
Schabas, William. 2007. An introduction to the international criminal court. Cambridge, 
University Press.
Schabas, William 2012. Unimaginable atrocities: Justice, politics and rights at the war crimes 
tribunal. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Sikkink, Kathryn 2011. The justice cascade: How human rights prosecutions are changing world 
politics. New York, W.W. Norton and Company.
States Parties to the Rome Statute 1998. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
Document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998. Available from: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/
nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf> 
[Accessed 30 September 2014].
Tadeo, Asiimwe 2012. Effecting complementarity: Challenges and opportunities: A case study 
of the international crimes division of Uganda. Available from: <http://www.asf.be.htm> 
[Accessed 12 August 2014].
Teitel, Ruti 2011. Humanity’s law. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Tenove, Chris 2013. Uganda and the international criminal court: Debates and developments. 
Available from: <http://www.africaportal.org.htm> [Accessed 17 July 2014].
103
Tolbert, David. 2013. Can international justice foster reconciliation? Available from: 
<www.aljazera.org> [Accessed 16 April 2013].
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Uganda Human Rights Commission 2011. 
The dust has not yet settled: Victims’ views on the right to remedy and reparation: A report 
from the greater north of Uganda. Available from: <http://www.Uganda.ohchr.org.htm> 
[Accessed 12 July 2014].
Wijeyaratne, Surendrini 2008. Promoting an inclusive peace: A call to strengthen Canada’s 
peace-making capacity. Available from: <http://www.ccic.ca> [Accessed 24 May 2014].
Wright, Valerie 2010. Deterrence in criminal justice: Evaluating certainty vs. severity of 
punishment. The Sentencing Project. Available from: <www.sentencingproject.org> 
[Accessed 20 May 2013].
